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CHAPTER I 
KIERKEGAARD AND HIS AGE 
S^ren Kierkegaard,   sometimes  called the father of "Exis- 
tentialism",   lived over one  hundred years ago  in the  city of 
Copenhagen.     Outwardly,   ais life was an unusually uneventful one: 
he spent  his  entire  42 years   (1813-1855)  in Copenhagen except 
for four trips to  Berlin;   he  led a  rather wild  life at  the 
University,  and was  converted;   though in love,   he renounced  the 
girl and never married;  a  popular magazine  caricatured  aim and 
be became  an  oeject of public  ridicule;   in  the   nidst of his 
attack on the  Danish State Church,   he  died.       Yet Kierkegaard 
did not  live  isolated from  his times.     Conditions of life and 
trie general climate of thought in Denmark  (and  to a  lesser 
degree,   in Europe)   deeply affected his  inner decisions about his 
life and the  focus  of his works as  an author.     As Price writes, 
"Kierkegaard was appalled at the  decay of human dignity in the 
Europe  of  his  day,  and  he was  convinced  that  the  cause  lay  in 
the nature  of the age  Itself,  an age which marked the  end of a 
way of life which had  hung together for centuries  but was now 
Robert Bretall   (ed.),   "Introduction",   A Kierkegaard 
Anthology   (New fork;     Random House,   1936),   p.   1. 
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••2 passing away. 
Barrett emphasizes  the decline  of  religion,   the develop- 
ment of  science,   and  the  increasingly rational  organization of 
numan life  as  the historical  trends  which characterize the 
modern era.     Between  the Xiddle Ages  and the twentieth  century, 
Western man lost   connection with a transcendent realm of being, 
i.e.,   God;   the  center of his horizon shifted from the reli- 
gious to  the   secular  In the  revolutionary effects  of the Renais- 
sance and the  Protestant Reformation.     The entire psychological 
bystem which enveloped the Individual's  life,   giving it  con- 
sistency   and completeness,  was  supplanted by  a confidence in 
human reason and  in man's mastery over the whole earth.     With 
these changes,   the rapid development  of modern science has 
tended to  estrange man rather than bring him closer to an under- 
standing of himself,     ingulfed by  the depersonalizing forces 
of modern life,   man lives  in an  increasingly mechanized,and mass 
society;  his  life has become externalized and he  lives on a 
level  of  abstraction,   i.e..outside himself,   which is unpre- 
cedented in human history.3 
To  these developments of  •modern" history Kierkegaard 
addressed himself,   though most  of their main consequences were 
not widely  explicit until  after the world-shattering war of 1914. 
In The Present Age,  Kierkegaard alludes prophetically  to  the 
2George Henry Price,   The Narrow  Pass(New York:     McGraw- 
Hill Book  Co.,   Inc.,   1963), P-   ™ 
3rtllllam Barrett,  Irrational Man(Garden City,   New York: 
Doubleday & Company,   1958^,  pp.   24-31. 
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drift toward collectivization in modern life.  The numerical 
quantity rather than the quality of the individual has become 
the qualification for the truth:  "Twenty-five signatures make 
the most frightful stupidity into an opinion,"* Kierkegaard 
writes with characteristic irony.  The collective Idea has come 
to dominate even ordinary consciousness; men are determined to 
lose themselves in some movement or to identify themselves with 
the age, the century, or humanity at large.  Kierkegaard writes 
of his age; 
Each age has its own characteristic depravity.  Ours is 
perhaps not pleasure or indulgence or sensuality, but 
rather a dissolute pantheistic contempt for the indivi- 
dual man.  In the midst of all our exultation over the 
achievements of the age and of the nineteenth century, 
there sounds a note of poorly conceived contempt for the 
individual man; in the midst of the self-importance of 
the contemporary generation, there is revealed a sense 
of despair over being human.5 
Kierkegaard denounoes the "public" as the master of this "level* 
lng process" which is "the victory of abstraction over the Indi- 
vidual.   The public Is that "all-embracing something which is 
nothing;" it is an abstraction "consisting of unreal individuals 
who never are and never can be united in an actual situation or 
organization—and yet are held together as a whole.** The pub- 
lic is less than a single man, however unimportant; for Kierke- 
gaard, the individual Is concrete while the crowd Is the abstract 
and therefore the embodiment of untruth. 
*S/ren Kierkegaard, The Present Age, trans.Alexander Dru 
(London:  Collins Clear-Type Press, 1^62), p. 91. 
5o/ren Kierkegaard, Coneludlng Unscientific Postscript io 
the Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson and ..alter 
Lowrle(Princetons Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 317. 
6Klerkegaard, The Present Age, pp. 66-67.  7Iblfl., p. 57. 
85*ren Kierkegaard, The Point of View fox Ml UMSk |§ Aft nQ 
Author, trans. Walter LowrlelNew York: Harper & Bros.,1962),p.98. 
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Klerkegaard's concern with the individual In relation to 
the crowd is part of a larger problem of the age which is the 
dominating theme of his thought:  "The central fact for the 
nineteenth century, as Kierkegaard...saw it, was that this 
civilization that had once been Christian was so no longer."? 
Here again the power of the numerical law enters to produce 
what is called Christendom—the most prodigious illusion to 
which man has succumbed in the modern age.  There are "Christian 
states, Christian lands, a Christian people, and (how mar* 
velousj) a Christian world."10 But, asks Kierkegaard, are there 
any Christians In a world where all claim they are Christians 
as a matter of course? Han is Christian eji masse: he arrives 
at such fantastic entities as Christian states by adding up 
units which are not Christian.  If all are Christians, the con- 
cept of Christianity (as Kierkegaard views it) is nullified.11 
Kierkegaard saw Christendom as a blasphemous perversion of 
Christianity not so much because it paid no heed to Christian 
truth, but because it made it an insignificant generality.1^ 
Everyone knows "privately" that the whole thing is untrue, but 
no one will say so "officially;" this is the existing state of 
decay and falsity,1^ In this context, Kierkegaard attacked the 
^Barrett,   p.   150. 
10. ■'Kierkegaard,   "The Attack Upon Christendom," A Kierkegaard 
Anthology,   p.   438. 
i:LIbld.,   pp.  446-447. 
12ojzfren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Ceath, trans. Wal- 
ter Lowrle(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1^41), p.166. 
^Spren Kierkegaard, Journals, trans. Alexander Dru(New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1.-59), P. 246. 
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hlerarchy, the instltutionallzatlon, and the smug complacency 
of the Established Church of Denmark with vengeance. By ex- 
tension, this attack had an Important Impact upon the Chris- 
tianity of the entire western world.14 
The character of Kierkegaard's writings Is related to 
his interpolation of the contemporary situation as well as 
to his definition of the individual.  As a child, Kierkegaard 
was profoundly Influenced by the piety of his father whom he 
considered a deeply religious man.  His Journals reveal the 
powerful effect his father's serious and melancholy nature had 
on him; while being drawn toward Christianity, he felt a dread 
of It.  The problem of the age he considered as his own: "to 
make men aware of Christianity."  This was a personal task 
which he undertook "without authority" and for his own educa-: 
tion.1^ 
In his definitive statement concerning his vocation as 
an author, Kierkegaard maintains that the one purpose behind 
his entire literary effort was "how to become a Christian."1° 
Acutely aware of the paradoxical nature of the Illusions which 
bound men to Christendom, he concluded that they could not be 
dispelled by direct means; this would only reinforce men's 
complacency.  By denying that he was a Christian, Kierkegaard 
endeavored to communicate with men on a level different from 
the religious; he felt that it was necessary to find man where 
he was and begin there.  He must* 
14Earrett, pp. 172-174. 
1^Kierkegaard,   Journals,   pp.   149,   175. 
l6Kierkegaard,   TJie Point of View...,  p.   145. 
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,..present the aesthetic with all its fascinating magic, 
enthral if possible the other man, present it with the 
sort of passion which exactly suits him, merrily for the 
merry, in a minor key for the melancholy, wittily for the 
witty, etc.  But above all do not forget one thing, the 
purpose you have to bring forward...the religious.H 
Acknowledging the double nature of his works, Kierkegaard con- 
tends that their aim, from first to last, was religious; he 
emphasizes (in retrospect) that the religious discourses of 
his early period were evidence of this direction, while ad- 
mitting that the precise nature of the "aesthetic" works was 
not clear to him until after 1848.18 
In the writings of the early period (1841-1845), Kierke- 
gaard employed a method of indirect communication—with pseud- 
onyms of various kinds, poetic imagery, humor, Irony, and pathos. 
Io compel men to take notice, Kierkegaard maintained a mode of 
existence which supported the pseudonyms; he wanted to be con- 
sidered the preacher of worldllness, an utterly frivolous and 
purposeless wag.  These "aesthetic" works were a deception de- 
signed to lead men from one set of beliefs to another; herein 
lies their paradoxical quality.  For Kierkegaard, it was nec- 
essary in the beginning to stir up the crowd in order to secure 
communication with the Individual immersed in It.19 
The years 1846-1848 mark a transition in Kierkegaard's 
writings and his life as well.  Beginning with Concluding 
17Ibld., p. 29. 
l8Ibld., pp. 73-74, 142T 150. 
li(Ibld., pp. 50-51, 146.  Though his purpose was religious, 
KlerkegaaroTwas very sensitive to the 'public' which he so de- 
tested.  The attack on him in the Corsair, a popular magazine, 
was a crucial experience in his life, directly affecting his 
decision to use a dlreot form of communication in his task. 
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ynaclentlflc Postscript,  he  concentrated on the means by which 
one moves toward Christianity  Instead of discussing Its  themes 
Indirectly.     This  change of costume,   as It were,  parallels  a 
metamorphosis  In Kierkegaard's life  In which he experienced 
a spiritual  reawakening?0    Of  the year 1848 Kierkegaard writes: 
"It was beyond all  comparison the richest and most fruitful 
year I  have  experienced as  an author."21    The  "religious" works 
of this  later period Include poetic discourses    on the  Christian 
llfefand The Attack  Upon Christendom.     The ^direction of Kierke- 
gaard's works  as  a whole is  from aesthetics  through  the Post- 
script  to Discourses at Communion on Fridays.     Their dialectical 
character parallels  the  problem in Christendom:   to become  a 
Christian when  one  is a  Christian of a sort,   to make  Christians 
22 into Christians. 
whether the 'real' Kierkegaard appears in the aesthetic 
or the religious works is an open question.  Thomas Hanna sug- 
gests that he wrote in a lyrical, Indirect manner because he 
had no precise words to express his insights about human exis- 
tence.  Indeed, the terminology Kierkegaard used was novel; as 
will be seen, it must be understood within a particular frame 
of reference.  The pseudonymous works are a description of the 
nature of the human situation; this description, in turn, is a 
vital part of Kierkegaard's attempt to redefine "what it means 
to be a Christian."23 In the Postscript, Kierkegaard writes 
20Walter Lowrle, Kierkegaard (New York: Harper 4 Bro- 
thers, 1962), II, 391. 
21Kierkegaard, Journals, in Lowrle, p. 393. 
22Kierkegaard, The Point of View..., pp. 17, 43, 142. 
25Thomas Hanna, The Lyrical Existentialists(New York: 
H. ,,olff, 1962), pp. 20, 23T" 
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that He endeavored, by the indirect form of communication, 
to bring to the attention of the reader the connection be- 
tween Christianity and existence.  This paper will first 
center one the Kierkegaardlan definition of the Individual 
and existence. Its general focus is on the pseudonymous 
rather than the religious works. Within this primary theme, 
however, a secondary one (which is an inherent part of the 
first) will be developed:  the Kierkegaardlan concept of 
Christianity which he views as the opposite of Christendom. 
2^Klerkegaard, Concluding.., p. 244, 
CHAPTER II 
A 3ESCRIPTICN OF THE HUMAN SITUATION 
The dlstinguifalling factor of Kierkegaard's thought la 
the seeming truism that man is, first of all, an existing Indi- 
vidual.  Kierkegaard "sought a concept of man entirely in terms 
of a certain psychology of himself."25 As a thinker and as an 
individual, he accepted the finite world as wholly real and 
the ordinary experiences of man's life as serious.  Thus there 
is much emphasis on the nature of love and marriage in his 
writings.  Kierkegaard restricted his inquiry to the only con- 
crete reality In his view—the ways individuals exist  in the 
world." Man's reality is defined most decisively by the fact 
that he exists: 
The only reality to which an existing individual may 
have a relation that is more than cognitive is his 
own reality, the fact that he exists; this reality 
constitutes his absolute interest.2' 
This particular definition can be seen more clearly if 
it is contrasted with the romantic and speculative views of 
reality.  Implicit in the ideas of both the romantics and the 
systerndtic thinkers, according to Kierkegaard, is an alienation 
cf the individual from his inner self.  The Romantics place 
their faith in the creative processes of the imagination and 
25Price, p. 12. 26Hanna, pp. 24, 28. 




aesthetlc sensibility as the means by which a grasp of rea- 
lity can be attained and existence given a meaning.  An In- 
herent part of this belief is a dualistlo image of existence— 
a dichotomy between the mind and the body, and between one- 
self and the world.  Also,one can proceed from the finite 
world into one outside him through the senses or the emotions; 
therefore, there exists, between nature and the human order, 
a fundamental harmony, which one can grasp.28 
Contrary to this, Kierkegaard denies that any direct 
grasp of reality through 'feeling' or 'intuition' is possible, 
tie saw man as a victim of the romantic philosophy—a mixture 
of deism, nature worship, intuitlonlsm, HerdeHa folk-lore, 
and Rousseauifcm.  In the first decisive break with the theories 
of association-psychology traditionally held by Western philo- 
sophers, Kierkegaard believed that human knowledge of reality 
was limited by the senses rather than expanded.2^ The tension 
between the world and the Individual's need to understand his 
existence must remain Intact; as Hanna explains: 
The foundation stone of Kierkegaard's understanding of 
human nature is this discovery of disaccord between 
the self-conscious individual and the world which is 
the object of this consciousness, and it is essential 
to recognize that Kierkegaard appeals to the univer- 
sal ground of human experience for proof of this 
assertion.2° 
In conjunction with his antipathy to the romantic ten- 
dencies of the age, Kierkegaard drastically criticized the 
speculative philosophers who attempted to render reality co- 
herent through reason.  In attacking "the System," he centered 
28 
29 
Price, pp. 89,99, 109, 113. 
Ibid., pp. 12, 83, 120. 30 'Hanna, p. 43. 
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his polemic  on Hegel;   to Kierkegaard,  Hegel's philosophy  sym- 
bolized a  belief basic  to the  western philosophic tradition: 
the cosmos  is  completely rational  and through reason man can 
find a meaningful pattern  In the world and his existence.31 
As Jean rtahl writes,   "Hegel had  shown that  the truth Is  the 
whole,  be   it in art,   in science,   in history,   and that beyond 
the particular whole  there  is the  absolute whole which contains 
everything."32    The Hegelian dialectic  is based on the pro- 
gressive evolution of  the Idea as a  logical  system and Is  rela- 
tive to an  observer contemplating the world process;   In the 
sphere of  contemplation,   opposites are  reconciled.and thereby 
annihilated.33 jne  institutions  of  society,   embodying univer- 
sal  truth,   are  constantly  evolving into more perfect  forms 
with which  man can identify.3^ 
In his monumental work,  Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
Kierkegaard mercilessly  satirizes Hegelian ideas.     In an age 
of vastly  Increased knowledge,  men have lost  themselves in the 
"totality  of things",   forgetting what it means  to exist;   it wis 
characteristic,   felt Kierkegaard,   that men were  captivated by 
Hegel's  scheme which posited a total view  of man and the world: 
Eut does our age bring forth a generation of  individuals 
who are born without capacity  for imagination and feeling? 
Are we  born to begin with Paragraph 14 of  the System?  Let 
us above all not confuse  the historical development of the 
Human  spirit at large with the particular individual. ^-> 
3lBarrett,   p.   158. 
32jean wahl, "Existentialism:  A Preface," New Republic. 
CXIII(October 1, 1945), 142. 
33cavid F. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard(Klnnea- 
:  Augsburg Publishing House, 154577 p. H5. poll8:
34 Price, p. 157. 35Kierkegaard, Concluding..., p.308. 
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Here a fundamental dichotomy In Kierkegaard's thought appears— 
the general versus the particular,  speculative philosophy Is 
concerned with the human being in general and therefore, with 
a fictitious objective subject.  Kierkegaard believed that the 
self ie not an organic unity consciously developing a system 
of thought; actual existence cannot be conceived a6 a finite 
whole.  Positing an identity between being and thought, the 
system brings contradictions together in abstraction and is 
complete In itself.  Existence, on the other hand, separates 
thought and being, and Is the opposite of finality.  From the 
existential viewpoint, there are contradictions in life that 
cannot be mediated; consequently,  *n existential 'system' is 
impossible.  In addition, 'positive knowledge' Is objective, 
i.e..uninterested in the particular existence; therefore, it 
offers no basis for an individual's understanding of himself. 
Ultimately, it Ignores the negative elements in existence, in- 
corporating them Into the positive whole. -^ As Price points 
out, Kierkegaard does not deny laws of thought and logic In 
their sphere; nor does he say that reality lacks any rationality, 
£ven scientific procedure has its domain in relation to physi- 
cal phenomena.  Yet reason cannot say, with positive certainty, 
what the unknown is; unaided, it cannot master the paradoxes of 
life.  Ultimately, all knowledge of the phenomenal world Is 
ambiguous.57 
The speculative thinker becomes a comic figure who falls 
to recognize the relationship between his abstract thought and 
his existence.38 He seals himself out of the world he has 
36 Ibid.,  pp.  267, 107,  112, 75,  275,  278,  201. 
37prlce,  p.   113. ^Kierkegaard,   concluding... .p. 268. 
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created, a world of wtiich, nevertheless, he Is still a changing 
part:  "In relation to their systems most systematizes are like 
a nan who builds an enormous castle and lives in a shack close 
by.. .,39 
Kierkegaard's attack on Hegelian theory clarifies the 
characteristics which he considered essential to the human 
situation.  As an author, Kierkegaard expresses his view of 
man's existence in pairs of contrary terms. Yet as Lowrle points 
out, his use of dialectics is different., from that of Hegel. 
Hegel "mediates" between opposites and comes to a point of 
repose; Kierkegaard continually alternates between opposites, 
emphasizing their contradiction and the paradoxes inherent In 
existence.  His pseudonymous works illustrate his use of dia- 
lectics in the sense that they form a sort of dialogue, con- 
trasting different ways of existing.^    The Kierkegaardlan 
dialectic is a dialectic of the self; the Hegelian dialectic 
is a dialectic of the world process. 
Among the pairs of contrary terms which are evident in 









Lowrle suggestB that each member of the pairs can best be de- 
fined In terms of its opposite.  Almost any term in one column 
can be contrasted with every term in the other; in addition, 
there is an essential similarity between all the terms In one 
column.*r 
^Kierkegaard, journals. p.»8.  40Lowrie, p.630. 4llbld. 
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It must be  emphasized that Kierkegaard does  not  Intend 
that these  pairs  of opposites be  established as a  formula for 
a concept  of existence.     For him existence is  too dense  and 
concrete  to be enclosed within a unified,   rrental concept*2  A 
system, Kierkegaard writes,  is by definition closed;   exis- 
tence does  not possess this quality of finality.     This is a 
further reason for the Indirect form of  communication;   the 
eluslveness of existence  can only be expressed  in  the  "absence" 
of a  system.^3 
Basically,   the  existential dialectic  is characterized by 
movement    rather than by permanence.     Kierkegaard  repeatedly 
asserts that   "it  Is impossible to  conceive existence without 
movement"  and  "an existing individual  is constantly in the pro- 
cess of becoming. N4J Life for the living is an unfinished pro- 
cess; the existing individual is—and yet he is notj 
Man 16 a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of 
the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity 
...a synthesis is a relation between two factors.  So 
re-arded, man is not yet a self.^5 
as Hanna explains, "the self-conscious individual is not but 
he tecome6."^» He points out an important distinction In Kier- 
kegaard's thought which clarifies this dialectic of trie self. 
It is based on a juxtaposition of a description of the nature 
of human existence with a prescription of what the  existing 
individual should become.  Kierkegaard's "conception of what 
■an should be Is rooted in and derived frc* his descriptions 
^^Kierkegaard, Concluding..., p.Ill. 42Earrett, p. 162. 
44lbld.. pp. 79, 273. 
Kierkegaard,   The Sickness Unto ijeath,  p.  17. 
46, Hanna,  p.   68. 
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0f what man  is."
4?     Thus Kierkegaard's beliefs about being and 
becoming are  closely  Interrelated.     As the lyrical nature of 
his works  cannot be  literally  reproduced here,   it  is necessary 
to separate  the  two  phases for purposes of analysis.     It must 
be remembered that  for Kierkegaard,   they  are  part  of  the  same 
process. 
For Kierkegaard,  man is neither soul nor body exclusively, 
but a synthesis  of  the  two.48    Physical  and psychic activity 
are equally  a part  of man's existence.     One  cannot  clearly 
divide his  thinking from his emotional behavior: 
In existence  thought  is by no means higher than imagi- 
nation and feeling,  but coordinate....The  task is  not 
to exalt  the  one  at the expense  of  the other,|lhought 
and feeling}but to £^ve them equal  status,   to  unify 
them in  simultaneity;,the medium in which they  are 
unified is  existence.^* 
Thus irrational  as well as  rational  forces are motivating 
factors  in human experience.     Price  clarifies this point: 
"The  self  is  not only  a thinking,   it  is  an eating,   a drinking, 
a feeling,   an imagining,   a lusting and fighting,   all  of whloh 
are carried on in the most Intense  simultaneity."50    Reason 
clarifies existence  and existence  gives  reason its  content and 
material.51     in this  context,   KaufT.ann emphasizes Kierkegaard's 
break with  the dualistlc Platonic  conception of  the  self or I 
soul as   substance,   comparable  to the body.     Originating motifs 
that remained central to existential  thought up to  the  twentieth 
$7Ibid.,   p.   84. 
48£>/9ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Uread, trans, Walter 
Lowrie(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 73. 
4sKlerkegaard, Concluding..., pp. 310-311. 
5°price, p. 110.        51Ibld., p. 117. 
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century, Kierkegaard portrays the self as an Intangible phe- 
nomenon, understood only In terms of possibility, dread, and 
decision.^2 
This synthesis of the self (the soul and the body) is 
reflected in the contrary terms, the temporal versus the 
eternal, and the finite versus the infinite.5' Kierkegaard 
defines time as a process, a "going-by" and an "infinite suc- 
cession"; the eternal is present in thought as "annulled 
succession."5^    The reality of the present exists in a dia- 
lectical moment between time and the eternal: 
The instant is that ambiguous moment in which time and 
and eternity touch one another, thereby positing the 
temporal, where time is constantly Intersecting eter- 
nity and eternity constantly permeating time.  Only 
now does that division,..acquire significance:  the 
present, the past, and the future.55 
Man is caught In the temporal, the worldly sphere; it is 
a part of the negative aspect of his reality of which Kierke- 
gaard, according to Hanna, was extremely conscious.-1" The 
temporal if related to the finite which Kierkegaard defines 
as the "limiting" factor in existence.  The eternal Is related 
to the infinite, the "expanding" or limitless element.57 in- 
finitude represents the uncertain, conditional nature of human 
experience} it is comparable to futurity and becoming in the 
individual's existence:  "To be constantly in the process of 
52*alter Kaufmann(ed.), Existentialism from ttostoevsky 
to part re (Cleveland: The .vorld Publishing Company, 1^56), p. 17. 
^Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 76. 
54Ibld., pp. 76-77.    55Ibid., p. 80. 5%anaa, pp.17,30. 
^Kierkegaard, The olckness Unto Death, p. 45. 
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becomlng Is the eluslveness that pertains to the infinite In 
existence. "-"^    One example of this eluslveness 1B the possi- 
bility of death; positive security becomes suspicious amidst 
the unknowns of living.  Kierkegaard describes the unrest and 
Incongruity of experience metaphorically:  "eternity lb the 
winged horse, Infinitely fast, and time Is the worn-out Jade; 
the existing individual is the driver."59 
As existence is not a closed system, the individual within 
it faces tomorrow; he is confronted with open posslbilites 
which suggest the chance that he may not continue to be the 
particular person he is.  The existing self Is, at the same 
tiir.e, both concrete and contingent.  The antithesis of actu- 
ality and possibility Is not definite, however.  Lowrle explains 
that Kierkegaard regards the actual, finite person as some- 
thing that has become and which is, therefore, permeated with 
possibility and contingency.. 9 In short, "actuality is a unity 
of possibility and necessity."61 
In this context, a fourth pair of opposites acquires 
significance—necessity versus freedom.  In relation to possi- 
bility, necessity is the limiting factor in the self.62  Ine 
necessary of existence is exemplified, according to Lowrie, by 
the laws of nature as well as moral laws; obligation and respon- 
sibility are a part of one's being.  Yet the whole of one's 
reality is not determined by necessity; unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard 
^Kierkegaard, Concluding...., p. 79.   5?Ibid., p. 276. 
60Lowrie, p. 629. 
6lKlerkegaard,  Ihe_ blckness Unto fleath,  p.   55. 
62 Ibid.,   p.   54. 
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does not Identify the necessary with the actual of existence. 
He associates actuality with possibility, and this 16 th« 
opposite of necessity:^ 
The oelf Is a synthesis of possibility and necessity. 
Inasmuch as it is itself, it is the necessary, *nd 
inasmuch as it has to become itself, it is a possi- 
bility.54 
For Kierkegaard, to exist is to possess the possibility 
of freedom; he often uses the terms 'freedom' and 'possi- 
bility' interchangeably.^5 within the individual's conscious- 
ness, the possibility of freedom exists as dread, an ever- 
present condition of human reality.°o y^e  essential charac- 
teristic of dread Is Its,lack of an object.  It is an agonizing 
premonition prompted by nothing concrete, but by horror at 
nothingness; it is the possibility of the possibility of free- 
dom: 
...dread is the dizziness of freedom...which gazes 
down Into its own possibility, grasping at flnlteness 
to sustain itself...the nothing of dread is a com- 
plex of presentiments which reflect themselves in 
themselves...67 
Ihe nothingness of dread which the individual both loves and 
fears is the relation of possibility to freedom and to indivi- 
dual existence.68 Price emphasizes that Kierkegaard recog- 
nized dread as a fundamental factor In human activity long 
before the advent of depth psychology.6* 
The central qualities of human reality are contradictory, 
S^Lowrie, pp. 631-632. 
64Klerkegaard,   The  blckness Into Lieath,   p.   5*. 
65Ibld..   p.   149.     66Kierkegaard,  The concept  of Dread,p.23. 
6?Ibld.,   P.   55.       68lPld.,   p.   48.       69prlce,   p.   65. 
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composed of factors which are constantly In opposition to 
each other.'   Composed of elements of the finite and the 
Infinite, the temporal and the eternal, the actual and the 
possible, the existing Individual is an incomplete synthesis. 
In his contingent and ultimately paradoxical condtlon, he is 
faced with freedom and dread and with death.  This reality 
posits a constant tension and unrest within the individual's 
consciousness which, Hanna maintains, Is "the undergirdlng 
theme of the entirety of Kierkegaard's thought."71 
70Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 45. 
^Hanna, p. 39« 
CHAPTER III 
THE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE 
The contradictory nature of human reality  (the essence 
of Kierkegaard's dialectic) is the basis for his assertion that 
life is a never-ending struggle:  "Existence is the child that is 
born of the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the tem- 
poral and is therefore a constant striving."T* Viewing move- 
ment as an Inherent part of existence, Kierkegaard conceived 
of an optimum level of existence, an authentic personhood, 
toward which the individual is drawn by the fact that he exists. 
Price suggests that Kierkegaard interprets existence as "the 
process in which I struggle to be the individual I imagine I 
ought to be."73 Kierkegaard's thought reveals three existence- 
spheres which portray different ways In which existing indi- 
viduals respond to the problems, joys, and anxieties of life. 
The spheres and the individual's task which is revealed through 
them are postulated from a conception of what man should be: 
There are three existence spheres:...The aesthetic is 
that 
the religi< 
of immediacy, the ethical is that of requirement, 
'eligious is that of fulfillment.'4 
Kierkegaard sees all human existence In terms of these spheres 
or a combination of them.  As Hanna implies, they must be 
understood in relation to the dialectical nature of existence 
?2Kierkegaard, Concluding, i.   85.   
75Price,   p.   116. 
74Klerkegaard,   "Stages on Life's  Way," A Kierkegaard 
Anthology,  p.   159. 
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and of the self.  In experience the spheres do not form com- 
pletely distinct divisions between individuals or within the 
self; they merge, thereby accentuating the paradoxes of 
living.T5 xo capture the mood and essential character of 
each sphere, Kierkegaard portrays each in a somewhat Isolated 
n anner. 
In £lther/Or, his first major work, Kierkegaard sought 
"to exhibit the existential relationship between the aesthe- 
tlcal and the ethical within an existing individual.*•* He 
depicts, as the author of volume one, a gifted young aesthete 
who experiments with life and trusts in the world to satisfy 
his desires.  This man's motto is "one must enjoy life";77 he 
lives for pleasure and the conditions for his enjoyment lie 
outside him.  Merged with the crowd which carries him through 
life, he reflects the world j.nd "coheres with the whole earthly 
life."78  The essential aesthetic principle Is "that the moment 
Is everything."7* The aesthetic individual, always choosing 
what pleases him, chooses only for the moment, and "is imme- 
diately what he is."20 Kierkegaard captures the quality of 
the aesthetic moment in a scene from a banquet at which one of 
the guests asserts: 
75Hanna, pp. 20,52.  ^Kierkegaard, Concluding... . p. 224. 
77ijrfren Kierkegaard, Slther/Or, trans. waiter Lowrle(Gar- 
den City, New York:  uoubleday &  Company, 1959), 11,-187. 
78Ibld., p. 193. 
"^Kierkegaard, Concluding..., p. 265. 
80Kierkegaard, £lther/0r. II, 182. 
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To be good, a thing must be all at once, for 'at once' 
is the most divine of all categories..ftso that what 
does not occur at once is of the evil.8* 
Kierkegaard's symbol for the Immediacy of the aesthetic 
life in its purest form is the sensuous-erotic genius—Don 
Juan of Mozart's immortal opera.  The essence of the unre- 
flective, joyous, amoral character of the aesthetic life, 
Don Juan "desires in every woman the whole of womanhood";32 he 
lives in and for the moment in which his desire can be satis- 
fied, but it never Is.  He Is "an energy, a storm, an impa- 
tience., that exists in a succession of moments."82 ihus his 
life has no actual coherence; he is constantly being formed 
but is never finished: 
...he does not have a stable existence at all but hurries 
in a perpetual vanishing, precisely like music, about 
which it is true that It is over as soon as it has ceased 
to sound, and only comes Into being again when it again 
sounds. 4 
Because of its immediate aspect, the aesthetic is not an. 
actuality but an "existential possibility tending toward 
existence..."85 
For Kierkegaard the aesthetic is the most fragmented and 
fragile mode of existence; yet It represents the life of the 
average man and a general level of experience.86 Devoting 
himself to pleasure above everything, the aesthetic man Is con- 
stantly beyond himself and his life lacks continuity.  In the 





Kierkegaard, "Stages on Life's way," p. 177. 
Kierkegaard, Either/Or,I, p. 98.   5Ibid., p. 55. 
Ibid., p. 101.   85Klerkegaard, Concluding.... p. 226. 
Price, p. 168. 
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aesthetlc Individual la ultimately concealed from himself 
because he never has the dialectical elements of existence 
within him; Instead they exist outside him.8*7 As Hanna ex- 
plains, the aesthetic man Is not conscious that the world Is 
not his ally and ha  la deceived by his confidence in some- 
go 
thing outside himself.00 Because he lacks this awareness, 
the aesthetic man has no self outside the moment;  according 
to Kierkegaard, he is in despair whether he is conscious of 
It or not.  He la In despair because he exists in the realm 
of possibility seeking to lnfinitize himself.  For Kierke- 
gaard the immediacy of the aesthetic life is precisely the 
definition of unconscious despair—the despair of not willing 
to be oneself."* 
In the aesthetic crisis, if one despairs of the imme- 
diate, the possibility exists for him to attain another mode 
of exlstenoe.  This Is the ethical sphere; Its basis, as Price 
maintains, lies in the Kierkegaardian dialectic of the self aa 
being and yet becoming.^° The self la primarily a possibility 
until It is posited by an act of will:  "The goal of movement 
for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision, and to 
renew it."51 The only answer for the aesthetic man la to 
"choose deapair"; in thla act of courage and honesty, he puts 
a distance between himself and the Immediate world.  Only In 
^Kierkegaard, Concluding..., pp. 387-388, 227. 
S8Hanna, pp. 41-42. 
^Kierkegaard,   TJie  blokness Unto Death,   pp.38,50,55.83. 
*°Price,  p.   174.   ^Kierkegaard,   Concluding....   p.   277. 
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thls manner can a man acquire a consciousness of the tense 
relation between the contrary factors which define his exis- 
tence.  This self-consciousness is Kierkegaard's meaning when 
he declares that in choosing despair, one chooses oneself: 
So then choose despair, for despair itself is a choice... 
what is it one chooses?  He chooses himself, not in his 
immediacy, not as this fortuitous individual, but he 
chooses himself is his eternal validity.** 
Cne enters the ethical life by an act of choice which Is 
much more difficult than an aesthetic choice.  In the imme- 
diate life, one chooses between relative ends; the ethical 
choice is an absolute one because it determines the personality 
of the chooser.  For Kierkegaard there are only two alterna- 
tives for the existing Individual: 
either he can do his utmost to forget that he is an 
existing individual, by which he becomes a comic 
figure...Or he can concentrate his entire energy upon 
the fact that he Is an existing individual.22 
From this ultimatum, one can see that the substance of Kierke- 
gaard's view of ethics rests in the nature of one's choice. 
Cne does not choose between good and evil, right and wrong; 
he chooses good and evil or excludes them.  Ihe important thing 
is to choose; neutrality is the evil:  "...in making a choice 
it is not so much a question of choosing the right as the 
energy, the earnestness, the pathos with which one chooses."94 
For Kierkegaard the determinants of ethics do not lie 
outside the existing individual.  The ethical life is not 
achieved by the realization of universal norm3, but by an 
92Kierkegaard, filther/Cr. II, 215. 
^Kierkegaard, qoncludlng... , p. 10^. 
94Kierkegaard, Slther/Qr. II, 171. 
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Inward decision arising from the depths of one's own Indivi- 
duality.  Truth determined objectively is not necessarily 
truth for the existing individual; In fact, Kierkegaard asserts 
that objective (i.e..speculative or positivlstic) truth repre- 
sents | flight from existence, bringing the individual Into 
contradiction with himself.95 Prlce emphasizes Kierkegaard's 
aversion to traditional ethics with its accent on formalized 
categories which he felt had no relation to the man who for- 
mulated them.  Traditional ethics, like reason, could not 
answer the questions about existence which were most crucial 
for Kierkegaard.  Though his view of ethics was Influenced by 
Kant, ochleiermacher, and Hegel, Kierkegaard's individualism 
carried him to a further extreme.  The imperative he proposes 
Is more fundamental to existence than Kant's;  Tne choice is 
not between good and evil, but between being oneself or not 
being oneself:  "To be or not to be—that is the question," 
Price reminds us.9° 
In a shift which iwenson maintains "effected for theo- 
logical thinking a veritable Copernican revolution," Kierke- 
gaard places primary emphasis on subjective reflection as the 
only real source of truth for the existing Individual.97 His 
definition of subjective thinking, however, does not entail a 
distortion of reality but a deeper apprehension of It.  Sub- 
jectivity, in the Kierkegaardian sense, is an attitude towards 
oneself of serious concern; it is a personal, passionate in- 
terest in thought and In its relation to one's own self In 
■'-'Kierkegaard, Concluding..., ppi 177, 183. 
9^Prloe, p. 155; also pp.15*, 1*9. 97^wen80n# p, 126. 
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9* existence.*  In objective truth, the emphasis is on ''what" 
Is said; In subjective truth, the emphasis Is on "how" It Is 
said. 99 
The ethloal man has 'chosen himself in despair and 
thereby has revealed himself to himself.  In the choice he 
recognizes that his Ideal self is not outside himself as some 
abstract pattern, but that it is his very self.  His task is 
to be himself and "to order, cultivate, temper, enkindle, 
repress... to bring about a proportionality in the soul..."100 
In contrast to the aesthetic mood, the ethical is charac- 
terized by its non-transient quality.  It is symbolized in 
volume two of £lther/Or by the married man, Judge William. 
As one example of the ethical stage, marriage Is not a sue* 
cession of disconnected moments.  It has a continuity which 
endures beyond the moment's sudden fancy: 
...the ethiclst..,1s a husband and concentrates himself 
upon marriage...by which, time la taken into the service 
of the existing individual, and the possibility of 
gaining a history becomes the ethical victory of con- 
tinuity over concealment, melancholy, and despair.101 
Instead of existing as myriad possibilities, the self has be- 
come an individual because it has chosen itself "concretely 
as this definite Individual...with these talents, dispositions, 
instincts, passions...as this definite product of this definite 
environment."102   The life of the ethical man is overt; ac- 
cording to Kierkegaard, his personality reveals itself most 
^Lowrle, p. 655.  ^Kierkegaard, Concluding;... p. 181. 
100Klerkegaard, aither/Or, 11,267. 
101Kierkegaard, Concluding..., p.227. 
102Klerkegaard, Either/Or, II, 255. 
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completely as the unity of the particular and the universal: 
He who regards life ethically sees the universal, and 
he who lives ethically expresses the universal in his 
life, he makes himself the universal man, not bv di- 
vesting blmjtlf of his concretion, for t.ien he becomes 
??tft}?g\!?Ut b? Nothing himself with it and permeating 
it with the universal.xa-> e
The ethical art of living is to be the one man In such a way 
that one is also the universal man.  This task does not anni- 
hilate the aesthetical within man.  The content of aesthetic 
experiences is not changed, but the way one lnterpretes it is 
revolutionized; the aesthetic Is no longer one's primary go»i$$6 
1Q5lbld.. p. 260. 
104 Ibid., pp. 182, 255-256. 
CHAPTER LV 
THE RELIGIOUS SPHERE 
In trying, to express the universal In his individual 
life, the ethical man Is constantly confronted with conditions 
which prevent him from attaining his Ideal self.  The Indivi- 
dual passion to exist clashes with the universals of ethics, 
faced with the bewildering complications between his duty to 
himself and to the world, the ethicist becomes aware of his 
own Imperfections; being responsible for himself, he is unable 
to avoid the responsibility for the failure to be himself.  He 
experiences a profound despair over his own personality which 
deepens Into a sense of guilt.  The ethical stage is finally 
broken up by the ambiqulties of existence.105 
In Either/Or, Judge* William Intimated the possibility 
of a form of life higher than the ethical.  He spoke of ex- 
periences so weighted with sorrow that they made the indivi- 
dual an exception to ethical or universal categories and brought 
him to a higher sphere of life:  this is the religious stage.10" 
In this sphere, the ethical duty to oneself is given a further 
qualification and subjectivity acquires a more specific inter- 
pretation. 
Wpriee, p. 181. 
106Reider Thomte, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 55. 
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Thomte  points out that  the  religious life does have  some 
significance  in the ethical  life.     The  religiosity of Judge 
William he characterizes as the universal  religious,  a  system 
of cultural values which are the background of  the  ethical life. 
The  Judge  accepts his  duty as  coming from God.  Yet his rela- 
tionship to God Is  never a private one;   God does not  enter 
Into  his  life   in any  special  sense.   This general  religious- 
ness  of the ethical  is  sharply distinguished in Kierkegaard's 
thought from true  Christian religiousness.     It is based  on the 
proposition   (developed above)   that  subjectivity is  the truth. 
Kierkegaard calls  it   'immediate•  or   'aesthetic'   religion be- 
cause  it  rests upon the  supposition that God is  Immanent  in 
the human personality  and that by  an inner effort one  can at- 
tain the  religious  life.107    To attain the  optimum level  of 
existence,   according to Kierkegaard,   on* must break with  this 
Immediate  relationship with God which is  a kind of paganism. 
As will be   seen below,   Christian religiousness,   the  true 
religious   stage,   is based on the proposition that  "subjectivity 
is the untruth. H108 
The ethlclst chose himself out of fear of concealment, 
the loss of himself in aesthetic dreams and melancholy.  Dis- 
covering that he is unable to fulfill the ethical demand, he 
faces a conflict between the ethical and religious modes of life, 
between the universal-ethical and a higher demand.  -* This is 
the theme of Kierkegaard's reinterpretation of the story of 
Abraham and Isaac In Fear and Trembling.  In God's command that 
10?Ibld.. PP. 65-66, 87. 
108Kierkegaard, Concluding..., p. 515.  109Ibld.. p. 231. 
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he sacrifice Isaac, Abraham encounters a duty which is the 
opposite of ethical requirements that he love his son; in 
the universal-ethical sphere, his act would be murder.  In 
the religious sphere, however, the sacrifice is obedience to 
God's command; this is a higher duty and transforms the ethl* 
cal duty into a temptation.  Out of this contradiction comes 
the "fear and trembling" and the dread inherent In the para- 
dox of faith.110 
In this moment of dizzy freedom to choose between the 
ethical and absolute requirements, Abraham takes the "absolute 
risk" by venturing to believe against the understanding that 
God would restore Isaac to him.111 In obeying God's demand, 
Abraham first makes the movement of Infinite resignation in 
which he renounces tae universal and the temporal; he resigns 
the love which is the content of his life, Isaac.  In this 
break with the finite, Abraham reconciles hlmsel^o pain and 
suffering.  Yet with the second movement of faith, its posi- 
tive movement, Abraham believed that what he surrendered would 
be restored to him even though he recognized the impossibility, 
humanly speaking, of retaining Isaac.  His faith rests on his 
belief "by virtue of the absurd;" because of it, he is able.to re« 
gain Isaa6  in all his flnltude.11^ the same time, the finite 
and the temporal acquire a new meaning for Abraham; he lives 
In the temporal only by virtue of a private relationship with 
110i^ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter 
Lowrie(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 38, 
.1, 106-107. 
111Klerkegaard, Concluding..... p. 384. 
112Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 47-45,55-56,65-68. 
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the Absolute,   God.     In the   'lean'   of  faith,   the absolute ven- 
ture whereby he believes  the absurd,  Abraham moves  into a new 
iodalitv  of  being—the religious:     "The   'real'   self is first 
nosited by  the qualitative  leap."115 
Unlike  the activities of the ethical man,  Abraham's 
ction is  concealed from all other numan beings;  outwardly,   it 
is unintelligible  because  the universal,  as an intermediate cate- 
gory,  has been  snsnended  in  favor of a higher value—the   reli- 
gious.     This  is  the  significance of Kierkegaard's assertion 
that there  can be a  "teleologlcal susoensiou of the  ethical." 
In the religious  sphere,   the man of faith determines his  rela- 
tionship to  the universal bv his relationship to  the Absolute. 
Paradoxically,  he appears  to  exist like the  ethical man and 
"...finiteness  tastes  to  him   lust as  erood as  to  one who  never 
knew anything higher..."115    As Kierkegaard  indicates,   the 
true  inwardness illustrated by Abraham demands no outward si*n: 
But the  less outwardness,   the more  inwardness,  and in- 
wardness  expressed through its ounosite(the outward- 
ness  of being wnollv like the otiers,  and teat tnere  is 
outwardlv nothing to  see)  is trie highest lnwardness- 
nrovided  it  is  there.xxo 
The  Intimate  connection that Kierkegaard establishes 
between  existence and Christianity can be understood more  Qtllf 
if this  characterization of the religious sohere  is  borne  In 
mind.     According  to Klerke,aard,   relics  existence is closely 
related  to  existence as a  human  being:     "If -.en  had forgotten 
113Kierkegaard,   The  Concept of Dread,   p.  71. 
ll4Kierkegaard,   Fear and Trembling,   p.  79. 
115Ibid.     p.  56.       ll6Kierkeffaard,   Concluding...,   D.   370. 
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what it means to exist religiously, thfey had doubtless for- 
gotten what it means to exist as human beings. "n7 One can 
truly become oneself (and a Christian) only by means of a 
private relationship with God and an awareness that one exists 
before God.118  This relationship (and the self) is posited 
only if the individual believes the absurd proposition which, 
for Kierkegaard, is the essence of Christianity:  "The eternal 
truth has come into being in time:  this is the paradox. "H9 
That which is eternal, and by Its very nature unhlstorical, 
was born, lived, and died in the person of Christ.  This para- 
dox is mirrored in the existing human being, a synthesis of 
the temporal and the eternal and the finite and the infinite 
situated in time. The essential principle of the paradox is 
becoming; for the existing individual, life is primarily a 
process of becoming.  His task in this process is to become 
himself; the fundamental expression for this task is faith: 
"for faith...refers to becoming."120 
In 'believing' the paradox, one does not 'understand' a 
series of doctrinal truths arranged in paragraphs.  According 
to Kierkegaard, this is the speculative explanation which 
transforms Christianity into objective knowledge and abrogates 
Its essence.    Christianity is not a matter for objective 
knowledge, but for individual belief:  "faith begins precisely 
117Ibld.. p. 223. 
118Klerkegaard, The sickness Unto Death, pp. 40, 44. 
11^Kierkegaard, Concluding..., p. 188. 
120Ibld.;also pp. 156, 198. 
121 Ibid.,191, 156. 
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where  thinking leaves  off.-122    f%  u  ^ nature Qf Chrl6tlinity 
to be misunderstood;   the  only way    to explain the  paradox is 
to make  it  clear that it must be  a paradox,   i.e.,   that it 
cannot be  explained by  rational means.     The measure of  the 
intensity of  faith in inwardness is the objective repulsion 
at the  center of man's being before  the Absolute Paradox.l23 
The dialectical  aspect  of faith is  that what is potentially 
offensive must be  embraced In spite of  its  offensiveness: 
One can   'know'  nothing at  all  about   'Christ.'     He  is 
the paradox,   the  object of faith,   existing only  for 
faith...lie  can only be believed.±24 
Therefore  the  tasks of faith are to  "discover"  the  improbable, 
the paradox;   and  then to hold fast to this discovery  with  the 
passion of  inwardness.   ^ 
Through the   "leap"  of faith,   a resolution of  the  will, 
the individual  comes  into  a relationship with God  and at the 
same time he posits  the  synthesis   (which owes from  God)   that 
defines his existence:     "In faith,   the   self  in being Itself 
and in willing to be  Itself is ^rounded transparently   in 
3od."126 In this  sphere  of Christian religiousness,   the ethi- 
cal does not  lose  its original  content  as  task  and human re- 
sponsibility;   but  it  is given a new  orientation as the  self 
becomes more  conscious of  its own imperfection,'" The 
122v 
123, 
Kierkegaard,  Philosophical Fragments,   in Price,  p.144. 
^Kierkegaard,   Concluding....,  pp,   188,   1S>8. 
12^xierkegaard,   "Training In Christianity," A Kierkegaard 
Anthology,   p.   388. 
125xi9rkegaard,  Concluding... ,  p.   20-;. 
'Kierkegaard,  The  olckness Unto Death,  p.   132.   Also pp. 126 
44,   21. 
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rellglous man Is  aware of himself  m existence  as a man be- 
fore Sod;  he  Is  conscious of himself  as  a sinner In the 
dilemma which posits  an absolute  duty higher than the ethl.  1 
Ml.18*    In  contrast  to  the ethical mood of retirement and 
the aesthetic mood  of  enjoyment,   the  characteristic expres- 
sion of  the  religious  sphere Is  suffering     The religious 
man believes  that  life  Is  found in suffering;   he experiences, 
in faith,   "the peril  of lying upon tne deep,   the  seventy 
thousand fathoms,   in order there  to find God."128    Thl8  auf_ 
fering persists  throughout life,   for the double movement  of 
faith is  not made  once for all;   faith  is  a  "repetition",   a 
'Jptrsistance  in despair"  which gives one  a fuller possession 
of cneielf.12*    The  religious man Is  thus  constantly aware 
of the tensions and Incessant  striving of existence.     According 
to Kierkegaard,   to understand oneself  in existence  is the 
Christian principle: 
But  to really  exist,   so  as to  Interpenetrate one's exis- 
tence  with consciousness,   at one and the  same time 
eternal,   and  as  if far removed from existence,   and yet 
also  present  in existence and  in the process of becoming; 
that  is  truly  difficult.130 
As a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, man is quali- 
tatively dlfferentlfrom God; he expresses "his own nature most 
adequately when he  expresses this difference absolutely."131 
'2duard Geismar,  Lectures on the Religious Thought  of 
opren Kierkegaard(Minneapolis:    Augsburg Publishing House, 
19571, "p.   5b.  
128 K lerkegaard,   Concluding....  p.   208.;   Also pp.   239- 
7 an 2^0,   256,   3*0. 
12?Ibld.. p.   235. 
131Ibld.,   p.   36>. 
130ibld.,   p.   273. 
CHAPTER V 
THfi aINQL£ INDIVIDUAL 
In the religious modality, the Individual exists "as 
the particular'in opposition to the universal."1^2 In his 
endeavor to obey God, i_.e_., believe by virtue of the absurd, 
the religious man is striving In isolation to fulfill God's 
absolute demand—that he be himself.  For Kierkegaard, there- 
fore,one's duty to be a Christian and to be oneself coincide: 
The Christian heroism (and perhaps it is rarely to be 
seen) is to venture wholly to be oneself, as =in indi- 
vidual man, this definite individual man, alone be- 
fore the fa«e of God, alone in this tremendous exertion 
and this tremendous responsibility.^33 
The religious paradigm is the Kierkegaardian expression 
for authentic selfhood and the optimum level of exiatence. 
The man of faith represents"that particular Individual" which 
Kierkegaard often (jail's-"my category."1^ As the decisive Chris- 
tian category, " 'The individual* is the category through 
which, in a religious aspect, this age, all history, the human 
race as a whole must pass."*25 "^he  individual" is above the 
race; against the numerical preponderance of the crowd, he Is 
the only salvation.  Kierkegaard asserts that "only one attains 
152Klerkegaard, Fear and Trembling., p. 92. 
^-^Kierkegaard, The .sickness Unto Death, p.4. 
i^Lowrie, p. 633. 
135Kierkegaard, The Point of View.... p. 128. 
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the goal"; yet every man, "inasmuch as he Is a man, can be, 
indeed, must be an individual."136 
In the isolation and concealment of the religious 
sphere, the individual returns to a point where revelation 
(the essence of the ethical stage) is impossible.  In this 
context, the significance of subjectivity as the untruth is 
clarified.  One does not become a Christian solely by a pas- 
sionate inner striving.  The God-relationship Is not entirely 
within oneself; that which aids the individual in entering 
a higher sphere is "something else,"i.e., God.  Paradoxically, 
the apparently aesthetic relationship (the Individual related 
to something outside himself) is the proper relationship In 
Cnristiaaitijr•  AB Iiiouite point© out, the secrecy regarded as 
harmful In the aesthetic and ethical spheres Is part of the 
individual's Inner religious life.137 
The movement of the existing individual to the religious 
modality, the most complete level of existence,lb "...from 
himself through the world to himself.**38 Or as Kierkegaard 
explains in the Postscript; "...the task is not to begin with 
the Individual and arrive at the race, but to begin with the 
individual and through the race arrive at the individual 
again."13^ Kierkegaard's description of the spheres of exis- 
tence expresses this movement:  from the aesthetic (concealment) 
through the ethical (revelation) to the religious (concealment). 
In order to define Christianity and its particular sort of 
136Ibld., p. 14*.     137Thomte, pp. 62, gfi, 
158Klerkegaard, Slther/Or. II, 279. 
13^Klerkegaard, Concluding..., p. 283. 
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lnwardness, Kierkegaard thought It was Imperative to clearly 
explain its prior stages which he did in the pseudonymous 
works.14  The stages reveal a dichotomy in Kierkegaard's 
concept of the individual between what the individual is and 
what he should be.  In order to stir up the crowd and attract 
attention to 'the individual', Kierkegaard gave the category 
a double meaning* 
'The single individual' can mean the one and only, and 
'the single Individual' can mean every man.  i»o if one 
would provoke attention dlalectically, one should use 
the category of 'the individual' with a double lash to 
It. 
In the pseudonymous books, the individual is primarily the 
Individual in the aesthetic sense of the pre-eminent person 
«et -part fro- others by differences of Intellect and cul- 
ture.  In the religious books, the individual is what every 
man is or can be by virtue of his existence as a human being. 
The ambiguity of this double meaning is the dialectic of 'the 
single individual,' who is at once the one and only and also 
T 4P every man.iH* 
The dialectic of the individual lies at the core of 
Kierkegaard's thought.  Based on the view that the existing 
individual is a being who is yet in the process of becoming, 
trie dialectic has its ultimate foundation in Kierkegaard's 
interpretation of Christianity:  the existential communication 
that the eternal God tecame a man in time.  As Kierkegaard 
emphasizes, Christianity accentuates temporal existence: 
14°Ibid., p. 251. 
14lKlerkegaard, The Point of View..., p. 124.   Ibid. 
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"the courage of faith is to grasp the temporal whole. M1*3 
Yet in acting for this life, Abraham exists, in the finite 
as a whole man by virtue of his belief in the existential 
communication of Christianity.  Kierkegaard's description 
of the nature of human reality is thus inextricably bound 
to his lde-j of what the existing Individual should become. 
Consequently, the existential and religious aspects of His 
view of the individual overlap.  In the final analysis, the 
Kierkegaardian view of what it means to be a Christian 
coincides, with what it :reans to be an individual, "the 
• igle individual." 
As an author and &6 a man, the central problem for 
hierkegaarJ was "how to become a Christian.**** In 
Cilllng attention to the category of Christianity, he also 
emphasized that of the individual and succeeded In his task 
...to read solo the original text of the indi- 
vidual, human existence-relationship, the old 
text, well known, handed down from the fathers— 
to read it through once more, if possible in a 
more heartfelt way.14-1 
^Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 70. 
144Klerkegaard, Ine Point of View..., p. 145. 
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